Lawyers secretly enjoy it when government policy overreaches common sense, as it provides lawyers with the chance to test their skills against the monolithic monstrosity of executive power. Such possibilities present themselves every now and again. It appears that the federal Australian laws passed recently which apply mandatory imprisonment for antisemitic hate speech may be a once in a lifetime opportunity for a smart lawyer to make a name for themselves.
Now it is necessary to preface this by saying that lawyers rarely concern themselves with the morality of defending their clients. As much as it is true that mandatory imprisonment for antisemitic speech is an unpalatably harsh punishment, there are few lawyers that will express much sympathy for individuals who seek to deliberately cause physical for psychological harm to others based on their adherence to an ideological position. Notwithstanding this, lawyers can represent their clients well without liking them or agreeing with their ideological positions.
So, with that out of the way, what are the major legal questions going to be about? Well, when ever measures to curtail free speech are made, one has to have regard to the implied right to political communication. There may not be a bill of rights, but this is a right that is implied to exist
As the new hate speech laws in Australia focus on antisemitic acts and Nazi symbolism, there is a legal problem in that they offer protection to only a limited group of Australians rather than applying equally to all. Equality before the law is a principle that is protected under the constitution and the implied freedom of political communication.
Section 117 of the Constitution holds:
“A subject of the Queen, resident in any State, shall not be subject in any other State to any disability or discrimination which would not be equally applicable to him if he were a subject of the Queen resident in such other State.”
A constitutional law scholar would initially scoff at the potential application of section 117 as it seems at first glance to be restricted in operation to discrimination based on state residency. However, when one looks at it through the lense of the different demographic distributions of Australian racial religious or cultural groups across states, s117 could be seen as protecting against laws which disproportionally affected residents of a particular state due to these demographic factors (e.g., more Jewish Australians in Victoria or more Indigenous Australians in the Northern Territory.)
Of course it must be said that Section 117 of the Constitution has not been interpreted that broadly by the High Court. The provision has historically been applied only when a law explicitly disadvantages people based on the state they reside in. The fact that a law disproportionately affects residents of a particular state due to demographic factors has not been enough to trigger S117 protections in past cases.
Past cases show the High Court has generally limited s117 to cases where the law itself discriminates based on state residency. Given this, a broader interpretation of S117 to cover demographic-based disparate impact would be a major shift in constitutional law. But, there is a possibility that this will happen, even if it is not a super high one. There are of course other avenues that may involve a successful defence of these laws, but the s117 argument is an interesting one that some very switched on lawyers expect to be argued.